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Abstract
We consider electoral competition between two political candidates.
Each can target private beneﬁts to some groups. A candidate has an
incentive to oﬀer high beneﬁts in the initial period, to deter the other
candidate from oﬀering yet higher beneﬁts to the same group in a later
period. We describe the equilibrium strategies of the candidates, showing
that candidates will intend to target diﬀerent groups, that groups targeted
in the initial period gain larger beneﬁts than groups targeted later, and
that the beneﬁts to special interests vary with their number and size.
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11 Introduction
Candidates often seek the support of special interest groups. One motive is
to elicit campaign contributions. A large literature considers such implicit or
explicit bribery. A seminal work in this approach is Grossman and Helpman
(1994), who show that organized special interest groups get tariﬀ protection or
export subsidies, whereas diﬀused interests do not. Another reason to seek the
support of special interests is votes: members of some groups may be single-
minded, caring deeply about some issue which little concerns most other voters.
One may think of pro-Israeli voters, or pro-Armenian voters, or sympathizers
with Catholics in Northern Ireland, or patients ill with some uncommon disease,
who will favor the candidate supporting their views on this issue, with little
regard for other issues. Such behavior raises several questions that this paper
examines. Will diﬀerent candidates appeal to the same groups, or instead to
diﬀerent ones? How does the size of a group aﬀect the beneﬁts it is promised,
and how does an increase in the size of some group aﬀect the beneﬁts other
groups are promised? How does an increase in the number of special interest
groups aﬀect the beneﬁts a candidate oﬀers each of them?
2 Literature
2.1 Agenda setting
Seeing proposals as made over multiple periods, and seeing diﬀerent politicians
able to oﬀer diﬀerent proposals, builds on studies of agenda setting in legisla-
tures, and more particularly on papers by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), Baron
(1989), and Harrington (1990). They assume that any legislator can make a pro-
posal, but that proposals are considered in a random order. In proposing and
voting on policies a legislator therefore compares the beneﬁts from the proposal
to the status quo, and to a future proposal.
2.2 Special interests
The literature on special interests is vast. Much of it centers on how a special
interest group attempts to inﬂuence legislatures. Our focus diﬀers, looking at
how candidates appeal to special interest groups.
In a study of voting, a puzzle is why people vote at all. One justiﬁcation,
consistent with our model, is that leaders of a special interest group oﬀer beneﬁts
to individual voters, inducing them to vote. As Uhlaner (1989) and Morton
(1991) note, a group leader can induce turnout among his members only if
the candidates oﬀer diﬀerent policies (so that the election of one candidate over
another aﬀects policy), and if the group a candidate targeted is suﬃciently large
to aﬀect the election. Both conditions hold in our model.
The paper closest to ours is Glaeser et al. (2004), who ask why parties
make proposals that diﬀer from each other, with a focus on issues with religious
content. Their explanation relies on the ability of candidates to target political
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targets them, while other voters are unaware of what has been promised.
Many authors note that electoral competition can cause governments to
favor small groups, at the expense of the public at large or of aggregate welfare.
Lizzeri and Persico (2005) ask why many democracies have few political parties.
In a theoretical model of party competition they show that an increase in the
number of parties increases the incentive of each party to oﬀer particularistic
beneﬁts. The eﬀect arises from the incentive of a party to focus its electoral
promises on a narrower constituency as the number of parties increases.
Persson and Tabellini (1999, 2000a, 2000b) give empirical evidence on the
provision of public goods in diﬀerent political systems. Milesi-Ferretti et al.
(2000) report on data suggesting that an increase in the number of parties
increases the fraction of public spending on transfers. Cox (2001) discusses two
sources of a political party’s bias towards targetable policies: to appropriate
surplus for itself, and to buy electoral support from pivotal groups. Coate and
Morris (1995) focus on how voters’ imperfect information aﬀects government
policy.
3 Assumptions
Each voter belongs to at most one of s diﬀerent special interest groups. We
mostly suppose that the special interest groups are identical in size, with each
controlling n votes. Each of two candidates aims to maximize the diﬀerence
between the number of votes he wins and the number of votes his opponent
wins. The amount of beneﬁts candidate i oﬀers in period t to the group he
targets in that period is xit. Where it causes no confusion, we use the simpler
notation x. This oﬀer is a binding commitment, which cannot be amended in a
later period. Members of a group vote for the candidate, if any, who proposed
the most beneﬁts to that group. The gain in votes is n, regardless of the level
of x proposed. We thus implicitly assume that a member of the special interest
group values the beneﬁt a candidate oﬀers by more than the voter’s share of the
cost.
4 Sequential moves
The simplest case to consider has candidates moving sequentially. Suppose the
incumbent, Candidate A, targets special interest group A. Then the second
mover, the challenger, or candidate B, will also target group A: a challenger
who outbids the incumbent both gets the extra votes from the group targeted,
and reduces the votes the incumbent would otherwise win from that group. A
challenger who instead made an oﬀer of the same size to a diﬀerent group would
leave unchanged the votes the incumbent gets from the special interest group
he targeted. Foreseeing this eﬀect, the incumbent may choose such a high level
of beneﬁts as to make the challenger indiﬀerent between targeting the same
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disadvantaged. That disadvantage is not surprising, since we ﬁnd the same in a
multi-dimensional voting model—the challenger can always ﬁnd a position that
defeats the incumbent.
More speciﬁcally, suppose candidate A moves ﬁrst, oﬀering a group xA
1 .
Candidate B, having observed candidate A’s oﬀer, moves next. If Candidate B
oﬀers a bit over x1
A to the group candidate A had targeted, then candidate B
gains −x1
A + 2n. If candidate B targets a new group, he gains n. Therefore,
to deter entry, candidate A will oﬀer xA
1 to satisfy −x1
A + 2n = n or xA
1 = n.
His net gain of votes is −xA
1 + n = 0. Candidate B, who moves second, can
oﬀer a small beneﬁt to a diﬀerent interest group, gaining close to n votes. Here
then is an advantage to the second mover, resembling that which appears in a
spatial model of voting with multiple dimensions, where the second mover can
generally ﬁnd a position that defeats the ﬁrst mover.
5 Simultaneous moves
Consider next simultaneous moves in each of two periods. The time line is as
follows.
1. In period 1, each of two candidates proposes a beneﬁt to a special interest
group. The proposals are made simultaneously
2. Each candidate observes the proposal the other candidate made.
3. In period 2, a candidate is active with probability π; with probability 1−π
a candidate makes no oﬀer in period 2, but the oﬀer he made in period 1
still stands.
4. A candidate active in period 2 can propose in that period a beneﬁt to a
special interest group. In period 2 a candidate cannot revise a proposal
he had made in period 1. Candidates make proposals simultaneously.
5. At the end of the period, each person votes for the candidate giving him
the highest net beneﬁts.
5.1 Strategies in period 2
To determine the strategies of the candidates, we work backwards, looking ﬁrst
at the candidates’ strategies in period 2. Two cases must be considered. Either
in period 1 both candidates targeted the same group, or else they targeted
diﬀerent groups. If they targeted the same group, then under our simplifying
assumption, in period 2 each must target a new group.
So consider candidate A, who in period 2 targets a group that was not
targeted by either candidate in period 1. Suppose candidate A makes an oﬀer
of x, randomly chosen from a uniform distribution on (0,M2), with M2 to be
determined below. (We shall see that this uniform distribution is consistent with
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gain in plurality to Candidate A consists of the following terms.
1. Candidate A oﬀers x, and Candidate B oﬀers, on average, πM2/2. These
oﬀers generate an expected gain in votes to Candidate A of −x + πM2/2
2. With probability π Candidate B targets some group. With probability 1/s
both candidates target the same group. With probability x/M2, Candi-
date A’s oﬀer is greater, and so he wins the support of that group, winning
n votes.
3. With probability π Candidate B targets some group. With probability
1/s both candidates target the same group, and with probability 1−x/M2
Candidate A’s oﬀer of x is lower than Candidate B’s. Candidate B gains
n votes from the special interest group.
4. With probability π(1 − 1/s) the candidates target diﬀerent groups. Each
gains n from the special interest group he targets, but the eﬀect is a wash.
5. With probability 1 − π Candidate B makes no oﬀer, and so Candidate A
wins n votes from the group he had targeted in period 1.
Thus, the expected gain in plurality when a candidate targets a group that
had not been targeted in period 1 is:
−x + πM2/2 + π/s(nx/M2 − n(1 − x/M2)) + (1 − π)n. (1)
The gain given in equation (1) can appear in equilibrium only if the derivative
with respect to x is zero. Solving yields the solution
M2 = 2πn/s. (2)
The corresponding gain in plurality (compared to making no oﬀer) is
(n/s)(1 − π)(s − π). (3)
We must also check the conditions under which Candidate A will want to target
a new group, given that Candidate B targets a new group. Suppose instead
that in period 2 Candidate A targets a group that Candidate B had targeted in
period 1, with B having oﬀered xB
1 . Then in period 2 Candidate A would oﬀer
that group a bit over xB
1 . (Recall that a candidate cannot revise an oﬀer he had
previously made). Candidate A’s gain is n − xB
1 . Candidate A will not make
such an oﬀer if n − xB
1 ≤ (n/s)(1 − π)(s − π), which is satisﬁed as an equality
if xD ≡ xB
1 = (n/s)(1 − π + s).
5.2 Period 1
Consider next strategies in period 1. In period 1 a candidate must consider what
will happen in period 2. Let F(x) be the cumulative probability distribution
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target the same group in period 1. With probability (1 − 1/s) they target
diﬀerent groups. For the moment suppose that in period 2 a candidate will not
target the group the other candidate had targeted in period 1. Then an oﬀer
by Candidate A of xA
1 to some group gives him an expected gain of −xA
1 +
(1/s)nF(xA) votes.
We saw above that if in period 1 a candidate oﬀers a targeted group xD ≡
xB
1 = (n/s)(1 − π + s) or more, then in period 2 the other candidate will
avoid targeting the same group. In equilibrium, for suﬃciently large π, the
oﬀer xA
1 must exceed xD; for otherwise, in period 2 Candidate B would make
a larger oﬀer to that group and win its support. (If π is small, that xA
1 will be
inﬁnitesimally greater than zero). For the moment, guess that the equilibrium
has a uniform distribution over (xD,M1), with M1 to be determined. The
expected beneﬁt to Candidate A when he oﬀers x is
−x + (xD + (M1 − xD)/2) + n(1/s)(x − xD)/(M1 − xD). (4)
For this uniform distribution to be an equilibrium, the derivative with respect
to x must be zero, or
sM1 + n(π − s − 2
sM1 + n(π − s − 1
= 0. (5)
The solution is
M1 = (n/s)(2 − π + s). (6)
Thus, in period 1 a candidate makes an oﬀer to a special interest group which
follows the uniform distribution on (0,(n/s)(2−π+s)). Recall that in period 2 a
candidate makes an oﬀer which follows the uniform distribution on (0,(n/s)2π).
And so the average oﬀer made in period 1 will exceed the average oﬀer made in
period 2 if 2-π+s¿2π, which holds whenever s > 1. In short, we would expect
interest groups getting oﬀers early in the campaign to do better than interest
groups getting oﬀers late.
5.3 Comparative statics
5.3.1 Increase in size of country
Suppose the country expands, with the number of special interests increasing
and the size of each group constant. Say the proportion factor is k. Then
appealing to a special interest groups costs a candidate kx instead of x from
non-targeted voters, and so reduces the beneﬁts of targeting a special interest
group. And the probability of two candidates targeting the same group declines
from 1/s to 1/(ks). That reduction reduces the beneﬁts of appealing to special
interests.
5.3.2 Probability of competition
What happens as we reduce π, the probability that a candidate can target a new
group? The direct eﬀect is to make candidates target fewer groups. A second
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increase social welfare. The third eﬀect is that an increase in 1 − π increases
a candidate’s beneﬁts from targeting a new group in period 2, and so reduces
oﬀers made in period 1. That further reduces beneﬁts to special interests.
5.4 Heterogeneity in groups
Under our story, we would not expect both the Republicans and the Democrats
to appeal to the elderly year after year. But candidates may target the same
group if the groups diﬀer in size: the large group can then attract both parties.
Consider then a large group and fewer small groups. Three eﬀects appear.
First, with fewer small groups, there is a greater probability that in period 2 the
two candidates will target the same group. That increases the x oﬀered each
small group. Second, the higher x reduces a candidate’s gain from targeting a
small group in period 2. The smaller gain makes it harder to deter entry, and
so increases x∗ in period 1. The higher x∗ means a higher average x in period
1. Third, the gain from winning the support of a large group increases. And so
M1 increases in period 1, or targeted beneﬁts increase. Thus, the formation of
a large group beneﬁts the small groups.
As an extreme case, suppose there is only one special interest group. Then
in period 1 both candidates will appeal to that group. The situation is identical
to a sealed bid auction, in which the highest bidder wins the prize, and pays
the amount he bid. In equilibrium each candidate oﬀers the one special interest
group a beneﬁt of n. Thus, no candidate obtains any net beneﬁt from appealing
to the special interest group.
6 Conclusion
We ﬁnd that under plausible assumptions diﬀerent candidates aim to target
diﬀerent interest groups. This is an equilibrium result, not a result that appears
in the absence of strategic considerations. We also ﬁnd that oﬀers made to
special interest groups will be more generous to them when made early in the
campaign than late in the campaign. Nevertheless, the generous oﬀers made
early will generate less political support to a candidate than will the smaller
oﬀers made later.
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87 Notation
x Beneﬁts proposed by candidate to interest group
n Number of voters in each special interest group
S Number of special interest groups
Mt Upper bound of probability density function for oﬀers made in period t
xD Deterrence level of xA
1
π Probability candidate is active in period 2
9